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1 Introduction
Recent advances in empirical monetary economics have advocated the use of market-based
monetary surprises to achieve identification of the effects of monetary policy shocks.1
Monetary surprises are typically computed as the price updates of interest rates-linked
securities that follow central banks’ policy announcements. The argument in favor of
their use is that, to the extent that these prices embed expectations about future policy
rates, if the surprises are computed within sufficiently narrow windows around the an-
nouncements, they can then be thought of as a measure (with error) of the underlying
monetary policy shocks.
Two crucial assumptions make market-based surprises the ideal candidate for the job:
(i) markets efficiently incorporate all available information, and it takes longer than the
measurement window for the monetary policy shock to modify the risk premium in these
contracts, and (ii) the set of economic forecasts on the basis of which central banks’
decisions are taken, and those of market participants coincide, leading to the equivalence
between price updates and monetary policy shocks. These assumptions make it possible
to first map all price changes into revisions in market-implied expectations about the
policy rate and, second, to effectively interpret these announcement-triggered revisions
as the monetary policy shock, up to scale and a random measurement error.
This paper produces evidence that challenges both these assumptions and argues
that under general conditions, and independent from the length of the measurement
window, monetary surprises capture more than just the shocks. Because private sector
forecasts are not bound to be, and are generally not equal to central banks’ forecasts,
what markets label as unexpected may or may not be unanticipated by the central bank.
That is, it may or may not be part of the systematic response to current or expected
macroeconomic conditions that make up the reaction function of the monetary authority.2
Hence, monetary surprises can incorporate anticipatory effects if market participants are
not able to correctly account for the systematic component of policy when they are
1In the paper we use the terms ‘market-based monetary policy surprises’, ‘monetary surprises’, and
‘market surprises’ interchangeably.
2We use ‘expected’/‘unexpected’ to refer to private-sector/market forecasts, and ‘antici-
pated’/‘unanticipated’ for central banks forecasts. An event that is anticipated and unexpected is in
the information set of the central bank but not in that of the public (e.g. news about future inflation).
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surprised by a policy decision. If the two sets of forecasts differ, the monetary surprises
cannot be thought of as being exogenous, or assumed to be isolating the correct signal.
Depending on whether market participants see the interest rate move as the result
of a monetary policy shock, or as part of the systematic reaction of policy to the eco-
nomic outlook, their economic forecasts, the expected future path of policy, and the risk
compensation they demand, will change in opposite directions, inevitably altering the
signal in the monetary surprises. This can induce important distortions in the estimated
responses of variables to the shocks when surprises are used as external instruments for
identification. A contractionary monetary policy shock that materializes as an increase
in the policy rate depresses output and prices. In such a scenario, forecasts are likely to
be revised downward. However, an increase in the policy rate may just as well be a signal
that the central bank is anticipating buoyant times, along with inflationary pressures.
If this is the case, forecasts will be revised upward instead. If investors demand a risk
compensation that is a function of the expected macroeconomic outlook, then this is also
likely to change following the forecast revision triggered by the announcement.
Hence, the surprises will in general be a function of the shocks and of the forecast
update triggered by the implicit revelation of central banks’ forecasts that happens at
the time of the announcements (see also Barakchian and Crowe, 2013; Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2017; Melosi, 2017). Using a simple New-Keynesian framework, we show that
the dependence of monetary surprises on forecasts of macroeconomic fundamentals makes
them dependent on past information as well. Consistent with this hypothesis, we doc-
ument a new stylized fact. Namely, other than being correlated with central banks’
forecasts, as also noted in Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Ramey (2016), high-frequency
monetary surprises are predictable by public data whose release predates the announce-
ments. This empirical regularity holds both across financial instruments and countries.
The predictability of market surprises using past information can be given a risk premium
interpretation (see e.g. Fama and French, 1989; Fama, 1990, 2013). Because monetary
surprises are effectively returns realized over tiny time intervals, the predictability can
be interpreted as indicating the presence of a time-varying risk premium – induced by
the dependence on macroeconomic forecasts –, that changes at the time of the announce-
ment because of the partial resolution of uncertainty about the future path of policy, and
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of macroeconomic conditions more generally, that is triggered by the policy decision.3
By the same token, and consistent with our model’s predictions, we show that once
the anticipatory effects are accounted for, and forecasts are aligned, past data become
uninformative.
We develop a new set of measures for monetary policy shocks by projecting market
surprises on central banks’ forecasts and forecasts revisions of the key variables that
are likely to enter the central bank’s reaction function, and use the residuals to identify
the shocks. The composition of the conditioning set is similar to the one in Romer
and Romer (2004). The resulting instruments, orthogonal to central banks’ forecasts by
construction, are shown to be uncorrelated with summary measures of the information
available to the public. Lagged factors summarizing the pre-existing macroeconomic and
financial environment, and that were significant predictors of the original surprises, are
uncorrelated with the orthogonal ones. The orthogonal surprises proposed in this paper
are thus better candidates for the task of capturing only the unanticipated monetary
policy shocks.
The importance of purging anticipatory effects from monetary surprises lies at the very
core of the identification of the effects of monetary policy shocks (see e.g. Sims, 1992). If
the central bank is raising the policy rate because it anticipates higher inflation or growth
above potential, failing to account for the anticipation will result in misleadingly attribut-
ing the cause of higher growth and inflation to the higher interest rate. Because of the
confounding role played by such anticipatory effects, monetary policy shocks ‘identified’
using market surprises can induce responses of key variables that carry strongly counter-
intuitive signs. In particular, significant real activity puzzles can emerge.4 Conditional
on the same empirical model, and hence on the same implied dynamics, we show that
using either the original or the orthogonal surprises as identification devices can imply
profoundly different responses of variables to the shocks. Generally, using the original
3Corroborating evidence of global investors demanding a premium to bear risk associated to central
banks’ decisions is in e.g. Lucca and Moench (2015); Vissing-Jorgensen, Morse and Cieslak (2015).
Similarly, Cieslak (2016) produces evidence of predictability of realized bond excess returns that is
induced by information asymmetries.
4Campbell, Evans, Fisher and Justiniano (2012); Nakamura and Steinsson (2017); Campbell, Fisher,
Justiniano and Melosi (2016) document similar evidence using survey-based forecasts. In particular,
these papers find that positive market surprises are associated with improved forecasts for both output
and unemployment.
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surprises delivers at best attenuated responses, due to the anticipatory effects inducing
responses whose sign is opposite to that implied by standard monetary policy shocks.
Intuitively, the correction to the surprises proposed in this paper eliminates the distor-
tions in the estimated structural impulse response functions that arise from omitting
information which both the VAR innovations and the original market surprises depend
on.
This paper extends the work of Barakchian and Crowe (2013), who are the first
to discuss the assumption of equivalence between private sector forecasts and central
banks’ forecasts in the identification of monetary policy shocks using daily surprises
in futures markets. Early uses of financial market instruments to extract expectations
about the path of short-term interest rates date back at least to the early nineties (see
e.g. Cook and Hahn, 1989; Svensson, 1994; Soderlind and Svensson, 1997; Kuttner, 2001;
Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Piazzesi, 2002). Rudebusch (1998) was the first to suggest
the inclusion of futures on interest rates in monetary VARs to overcome the potentially
misspecified reaction function implicitly estimated in these models. Estimates of the un-
expected component of policy have become more sophisticated with the availability of
high-frequency financial data (Sack, 2004; Gu¨rkaynak, 2005; Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Swan-
son, 2005). Gertler and Karadi (2015) are the first to use monetary surprises as external
instruments for the monetary policy shock in a Proxy Structural VAR (Stock and Wat-
son, 2012; Mertens and Ravn, 2013). The availability of potentially clean measures of
monetary shocks has since spurred a number of diverse applications whereby monetary
surprises extracted from financial market instruments have been used to quantify the
effects of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks. To mention just
a few, Hanson and Stein (2015) find large responses of long-term real rates to monetary
policy shocks and explore the transmission of monetary policy to real term premia using
intraday changes in the two-year nominal yield. Nakamura and Steinsson (2017) employ
a ‘policy news shock’ – defined as the first principal component of monetary surprises
calculated using a selection of interest rate futures – to show that long-term nominal and
real rates respond roughly one to one to monetary policy shocks. Similarly, Swanson
(2015) identifies ‘forward guidance’ and ‘large-scale asset purchases’ dimensions of mon-
etary policy shocks at the zero lower bound using principal components of a selection of
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futures on short-term interest rates and long-term government bond yields, and employs
them to study the effects of unconventional monetary policy on asset prices. Glick and
Leduc (2015) use monetary surprises in federal funds futures and a collection of Treasury
rate futures at longer maturities to study the effects of conventional and unconventional
monetary policy on the dollar. Finally, Rogers, Scotti and Wright (2014) measure the
pass-through of unconventional monetary policy implemented by four different central
banks on asset prices by using monetary surprises calculated from long-term government
bond yields in each of the monetary areas considered. Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco
(2016) study the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the presence of informational
frictions, and discuss the challenges to identification posed by the presence of information
asymmetries and by the slow and imperfect absorption of information by both economic
agents and the central bank. Monetary surprises are there used as a proxy for the ag-
gregate revisions in expectations to construct an identification strategy that is robust to
non-nested information sets of the central bank and private agents.
2 The Information Content of Monetary Surprises
Consider an economy in which the behavior of households and firms is described by the
following two equations:5
xt = xt+1∣t − σ(it − pit+1∣t − rnt ), (1)
pit = βpit+1∣t + κxt. (2)
Eq. (1) is obtained from the linearized Euler equation and expresses the current output
gap xt as a function of the expected output gap xt+1∣t ≡ Et[xt+1] and of future expected
deviations of the real interest rate from its natural rate rnt . Within this simple model,
the natural rates of interest and of output are both functions of exogenous shocks to
technology and preferences. One could think of richer frameworks where the natural in-
terest rate is also a function of other shocks, such as to households borrowing constraints,
5The model we refer to is a workhorse three-equation New-Keynesian model (see Woodford, 2003;
Gal´ı, 2008, for textbook treatment).
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or to the financial sector, without altering the essence of the argument discussed below.
The parameter σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The behavior of
inflation is regulated by the Phillips curve – Eq. (2), where κ regulates the size of the
response of inflation to changes in the output gap. The central bank sets the interest rate
according to the following simple rule
rt ≡ it − pit+1∣t = rnt + et, (3)
therefore, the monetary authority chooses the real interest rate in such a way to track
the natural rate of interest, with deviations from the rule denoted by et.6
Solving Eqs. (1) and (2) forward one obtains
xt = −σ ∞∑
j=0 (rt+j∣t − rnt+j∣t) , (4)
pit = κ ∞∑
j=0βjxt+j∣t . (5)
Absent any monetary policy shock – i.e. if et = 0, the real interest rate equals the natural
rate, and both the output gap and expected inflation are equal to zero. Conversely, a
monetary policy tightening (loosening) will result in the real rate being larger (smaller)
than the natural rate, a contraction (expansion) in economic activity, and a decline (rise)
in inflation.
Within this framework, agents form expectations by projecting on current realizations
of the shocks, of which current macroeconomic fundamentals are a contemporaneous
function. Let the policy announcement be scheduled in the interval (t − ∆t, t). The
expected level of the nominal interest rate just before the announcement can be expressed
as
it∣t−∆t = rnt∣t−∆t = ΘΩt, (6)
where we assume that agents know that the central bank will revert to its rule following
any shock, from which it follows that pit+1∣t−∆t = 0. Ωt is the vector collecting the current
6For the sake of building the intuition, we choose to adopt the simple framework in Andrade and
Ferroni (2016), however, the rule can be extended to include a Taylor principle as in Nakamura and
Steinsson (2017).
7
realizations of macroeconomic fundamentals, and Θ is a non-linear function of primitive
model parameters and denotes the coefficients of the projection. In reality, however, the
current value of macroeconomic fundamentals is not known in real time and must be
estimated. Eq. (6) thus transforms into
rnt∣t−∆t = ΘΩ̂t∣t, (7)
where Ω̂t∣t denotes the forecast/nowcast of Ωt. It is assumed that in the time interval ∆t
no news relative to macro fundamentals are released to the public, that is, the monetary
announcement is the only event in the measurement window. In the absence of competing
data releases, and conditional on the forecasting model being unchanged, Ω̂t∣t = Ω̂t∣t−∆t.
Consider the price of a futures contract on the nominal interest rate that pays the
rate prevailing at some future date t + h
p
(h)
t = Et[it+h] + ζ(h)t , (8)
where ζ
(h)
t denotes the risk premium that may be present in the contract. Eq. (8)
expresses the price of the futures contract as a function of the expected future nominal
rate it plus a risk compensation that investors require to hold such a contract to maturity.
Using Eqs. (7) and (8) one can express the price just before the announcement as
p
(h)
t−∆t = it+h∣t−∆t( Ω̂t∣t ) + ζ(h)( Ω̂t∣t ), (9)
where the dependence on the economic forecasts is made explicit. In Eq. (9) the time-
variation in the risk premium is derived from the dependence of the premium on either
realized or expected macroeconomic fundamentals.
Without loss of generality, consider now the futures contract expiring at the end of
the current month, i.e. the front contract. Assume that market participants have access
to the same pool of public data as the central bank, and that they know the reaction
function of monetary authority. We also assume that the reaction function does not vary.7
7The scenario in which the central bank’s reaction function evolves over time and agents gradually
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The price that investors attach to such a contract just before the relevant monetary policy
announcement is equal to
pt−∆t = imt∣t−∆t + ζ( Ω̂mt∣t ) = f( Ω̂mt∣t ) + ζ( Ω̂mt∣t ). (9′)
im
t∣t−∆t is the expected policy decision. Given market participants’ forecasts about Ωt, and
the central bank’s reaction function f , what investors expect the interest rate to be after
the announcement is equal to f( Ω̂m
t∣t ). Conditional on the same set of forecasts, the risk
premium equals ζ( Ω̂m
t∣t ).
After the policy decision is revealed, the futures price is updated accordingly
pt = f( Ω̂cbt∣t ) + et´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
it
+ζ( Ω̂cbt∣t ). (10)
The new policy rate is a function of the central bank’s forecast Ω̂cb
t∣t and of a possibly
non-zero shock et. Consequently, the newly demanded risk premium is also revised. The
risk compensation is associated to the uncertainty about the future path of policy, and of
macroeconomic conditions more generally; if the forecast for Ωt changes, the risk premium
that investors demand will reflect that change.
Market surprises are computed as the price update that follows the communication
of the interest rate decision, that is, mpst ≡ pt − pt−∆t.8 All else equal, the fact that the
economic forecasts of the central bank may not coincide with those of the private sector
makes the surprises a contemporaneous function of more than just the monetary policy
shocks. In fact, for the price update to be mapped into the monetary policy shock it
has to be the case that Ω̂cb
t∣t = Ω̂mt∣t (see also Barakchian and Crowe, 2013); in general, the
monetary surprise will otherwise be equal to
mpst ≡ pt − pt−∆t = f (Ω̂cbt∣t − Ω̂mt∣t) + ζ (Ω̂cbt∣t − Ω̂mt∣t) + et . (11)
learn about it is to a large extent observationally equivalent to the one discussed here. While trying to
disentangle the two cases goes beyond the scope of the present analysis, we note here that the increased
transparency in central banks’ communication about their decisions, intentions and preferences might
have made our assumptions less untenable. We leave a proper investigation in this sense for future
research.
8Specific details on futures on interest rates and their use in the construction of monetary surprises
are in Appendix A.
9
Eq. (11) establishes that it suffices that private forecasts do not align with those
of the monetary authority for the surprise to be an invalid tool for identification. This
assumption has been challenged in a number of papers, starting with the seminal con-
tribution of Romer and Romer (2000). Note that for Eq. (11) to hold it suffices that
the central bank and market participants only differ in the forecasting model they choose
to employ, everything else, including the reaction function f(⋅), being equally known to
both.
Monetary surprises can therefore incorporate anticipatory effects, with important con-
sequences for the correct identification of the responses of variables to the shocks. The
misalignment of Ω̂cb
t∣t and Ω̂mt∣t leads agents to update their own forecasts in directions which
are incompatible with the responses to a monetary policy shock predicted by standard
macroeconomic theory. Using Blue Chip forecasts, Nakamura and Steinsson (2017) show
that increases in interest rates are associated with significant upward revision of growth
forecasts, up to about a year into the future. Similar evidence is reported in Campbell,
Evans, Fisher and Justiniano (2012) and Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano and Melosi (2016).
Campbell et al. (2012) also find that Blue Chip forecasts of unemployment are revised
downward following an increase in the policy rate. Similarly, forecasters expect higher
inflation. Campbell et al. (2016) attribute these puzzling responses to the fact that the
central bank and the public are not equally well informed about macroeconomic fun-
damentals, that is, their forecasts differ: policy decisions transfer knowledge about the
central bank’s forecasts and this triggers private sector forecasts revisions of the ‘wrong’
sign.
Eq. (11) implies that just like professional forecasters, market participants are subject
to the same type of information asymmetries. And that following an announcement
they may revise prices because of a monetary policy shock, of a forecast update, or a
combination of the two. Removing the confounding factors is thus critical for the correct
identification of the shocks and their effects. Figure I illustrates the point.
[ insert Figure I about here ]
In Section 5, motivated by Eq. (11), we construct orthogonal surprises by projecting
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market surprises (pt−pt−∆t) on the lagged policy rate and on central bank’s forecasts, and
use the residuals to identify the monetary policy shocks. The fitted part of this regression
embeds the component of market surprises that instead captures the forecast update (and
consequential revision in the risk premium). The impulse response functions (IRFs) in
Figure I separate the effects that are due to the monetary policy shocks (residuals of Eq.
(16), solid lines), from those induced by the forecast update that happens at the time
of the policy announcements (fitted part of Eq. (16), dashed lines). Conditional on the
same VAR, and hence on the same set of residuals and implied dynamics, the two sets
of responses are obtained by using each of the two components in turn as an external
instrument.9 Empirically, the contemporaneous transmission coefficients that determine
the impact responses are obtained as a function of the projection of the reduced-form VAR
innovations on each of the two components of the monetary surprises (see next section for
details). The responses are normalized such that both components raise the policy rate
by 1% on impact. The two components of the monetary surprises are orthogonal to one
another, hence, the IRFs recovered by the market surprises will be generally attenuated
due to the components triggering responses of the main economic variables that carry
opposite signs. Depending on which of the two prevails, the overall responses to a shock
‘identified’ using market surprises may thus lead to responses to a monetary policy shock
that are strongly counterintuitive, such as those implied by the components in Figure I.
In Section 3 we explore the technical reasons behind the puzzling responses that may
arise when using monetary surprises to identify the shocks. The testable implications of
Eq. (11) are in Section 4.
3 Instruments for Monetary Policy Shocks
Let yt be an n-dimensional vector of observables whose responses to the structural shocks
in et are given by
yt = [A(L) ]−1ut = C(L)Bet, (12)
9VAR(12) estimated in levels over the period 1969:2014. Other variables included are an index of
commodity prices and the one year rate as the policy variable. See Section 5 for further details.
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where C(L)B are the structural IRFs. ut are the reduced-form innovations, with ut = Bet.
B collects the contemporaneous transmission coefficients.10
Suppose one is interested in calculating the responses of yt to a particular shock in et,
call it the monetary policy shock, and denote it by e●t . The identification of the relevant
column b● of B is achieved via a set of variables zt, not in yt, such that
E [ e●tz′t ] = φ′, E [ e○tz′t ] = 0, (13)
and φ is non-singular. e○t denotes structural shocks other than the one of interest. If one
or more variables zt can be found such that these conditions are satisfied, then b● can
be identified up to scale and sign using only moments of observables.11 Conditions in
Eq. (13) are the key identifying assumptions, and resemble the standard conditions for
external instruments’ validity. Whilst in general there is no formal way to verify that the
conditions in Eq. (13) hold, the identification relies on a number of other requirements
that only involve observables and are thus fully testable.12
In particular for our purpose, suppose b● is estimated using the two-step procedure
whereby the reduced-form innovations ut are projected onto the instruments zt. Let Xt
be a vector of variables omitted from the VAR but such that
E [ ztX′t−1 ] ≠ 0 , E [utX′t−1 ] ≠ 0 . (14)
In this case, the two-step procedure is misspecified and the identification compromised,
as Eq. (14) implies potentially severely biased estimates of the parameters in b●. The
discussion in the next section, and related to the predictability of the monetary surprises,
will technically fall within this context.
An equivalent way of addressing the identification of b● is to cast the problem in a
measurement error framework where the structural shock of interest is treated as an un-
10A(L) ≡ [ In − A1L − . . . − ApLp ], where Ai, i = 1, . . . p, are conformable matrices of autoregressive
coefficients. The structural shocks are such that E [ et ] = 0, E [ ete′t ] = In and E [ ete′τ ] = 0 ∀τ ≠ t.
11See Stock and Watson (2012); Mertens and Ravn (2013); Montiel-Olea, Stock and Watson (2016).
12See Stock and Watson (2017) for a thorough description of the conditions under which external
instrument methods produce valid inference on dynamic causal effects.
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observed regressor, and the external instrument is explicitly modelled as a proxy variable
zt = Φe●t + νt, (15)
where νt is an i.i.d. measurement error and Φ is non-singular. In this case, all the relevant
model parameters ( i.e. A(L) and B) are jointly estimated in an error-in-variable system
where zt is effectively treated as a scaled version of the shock up to a random error.
This procedure delivers consistent estimates of b● only under the additional assumption
that the instrument is uncorrelated with the lagged endogenous variables included in the
VAR. Furthermore, Eq. (15) implies that just like the shock itself, the instrument should
not be forecastable given lagged information relative to own lags or lags of any other
variable, regardless of whether it is included in yt or not. These conditions resemble the
informational sufficiency requirement on the observables included in any structural VAR
(see e.g. Forni and Gambetti, 2014), and call for the absence of any endogenous variation
in the dynamics of zt. The intuition here is that if this is not the case, then there is no
reason why one would not want to include zt in the set of endogenous observables yt and
let it act as an instrument for itself (see e.g. Bagliano and Favero, 1999; Barakchian and
Crowe, 2013). In fact, an equivalent way of estimating the transmission coefficients is to
include zt in the set of endogenous observables and identify the monetary policy shock
by ordering it first in a standard Cholesky triangularization.13
4 Predictable Surprises
In this section we take Eq. (11) to the data, and test the dependence of monetary surprises
on both central banks’ forecasts and past information. In the language of Section 3, we
test for E[ ztX′t−1 ] = 0, where Xt−1 is a collection of variables likely to be in the information
set of either or both the central bank and market participants at the time of the monetary
announcement.14 In what follows, US monetary surprises are those in Gu¨rkaynak, Sack
13Empirically, the successful identification of b● is ultimately a question of both specifying the VAR
correctly, and singling out a reasonably valid instrument. If doubts arise about the effective exogene-
ity of the chosen instrument, one way to mitigate the distortions on the estimated contemporaneous
transmission coefficients is to enrich the information set of the VAR to produce ‘cleaner’ innovations.
14We abstract from concerns related to the design of trading strategies and out-of-sample predictability
of monetary surprises that, while relevant in their own right, go beyond the scope of the present analysis.
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and Swanson (2005), extended until 2012. Namely, the surprises are extracted from the
first (mp1) and fourth (ff4) federal funds futures, and from the second (ed2), third (ed3)
and fourth (ed4) Eurodollar futures. UK surprises are novel, and constructed using the
next expiring short sterling futures (ss1). The sample for the construction starts in
June 1997, which coincides with the first decision meeting after the Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee was granted operational independence for setting monetary
policy. To assess the behavior of market participants around policy-relevant events other
than the rate announcements, UK monetary surprises are also computed on extended sets
of dates that add to the rate decision the release of the minutes of the MPC meetings
(ss1m), and of the quarterly Inflation Report (ss1mir). Because the latter events are
often contemporaneous to major economic data releases that are also market movers, we
control for all data releases which are scheduled within the measurement window. The
length of the measurement window (∆t) is equal to 30 minutes, with the exception of the
broad UK-based surprises that also cover the release of the minutes and of the Inflation
Report (i.e. the ss1mir case). When the IR is the relevant policy event, we set ∆t
equal to 90 minutes to account for the duration of the IR press conference. The reader is
referred to Appendix A for a thorough description of the surprises and their time series
properties, and of the financial instruments used for their construction.15
In Table I, US monetary surprises are projected onto Greenbook forecast revisions
between two consecutive meetings for output (y), inflation (pi), and unemployment (u).
Forecast horizons considered are h = 0,1,2, and expressed in quarters. Hence, ∆yGB
t∣t
denotes the forecast revision for current-quarter output growth. All regressions include
a constant and 4 lags of the dependent variable. The sample considered is 1990-2009.16
September 2001 is not included to address the concerns in in Campbell et al. (2012).
Forecasts are aligned such that they correspond to the FOMC meeting the surprises refer
to. For the months in which no FOMC meeting is scheduled the revision is set to zero.
Greenbook forecast revisions are a function of the update in the information set of the
15Cesa-Bianchi, Thwaites and Vicondoa (2016) also use high-frequency data to construct proxies for
monetary policy shocks in the UK; their proxies roughly correspond to the monetary surprise calculated
around all policy events constructed here (ss1mir) and further discussed in Appendix A.
16We stop in 2009 to avoid the discontinuity introduced by the Zero/Effective Lower Bound episodes.
Monetary surprises also correlate with Greenbook level forecasts for output, inflation, and unemployment.
Regressions are not reported for space considerations but are available on the Online Appendix.
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Federal Reserve that occurs between any two consecutive meetings. Results in the table
confirm that central banks’ forecasts are highly informative for all the monetary surprises
considered, in support of the view that central bank’s forecasts do enter the specification
in Eq. (11). The correlation of high-frequency market surprises with central bank’s
forecasts is also noted in Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Ramey (2016).
[ insert Table I about here ]
In Section 2 we postulated that the dependence of monetary surprises on central
banks’ forecasts makes them dependent on past information as well. This was summa-
rized by the premium component ζ (Ω̂cb
t∣t − Ω̂mt∣t). We test this hypothesis in Table II.
The top panel of Table II reports predictability results relative to a set of ten lagged
macroeconomic and financial factors estimated from the 134 US monthly series assem-
bled in McCracken and Ng (2015).17 The factors enter the specification with a month’s
lag. As before, all regressions include a constant and 4 lags of the dependent variable.
Surprises are predictable by past information, summarized by the lagged macro-financial
factors. One concern with regressing on these factors is that they are estimated on the
last available vintage of data, that thus includes revisions that occurred after the surprise
was measured. Moreover, due to the sometimes significant delay with which data are
released, the information set from which the factors are extracted was not entirely visible
at the time of the announcements, even if factors are lagged one month. To address this
concern, we repeat the factor extraction only on the subset of the variable in McCracken
and Ng (2015) that are not subject to revision, such as financial variables and surveys.
These are the f∗ factors in the bottom panel of Table II. Results show that the depen-
dence of monetary surprises on past information survives also when only data that were
effectively available before the time of the announcement are considered.18
17Factors are obtained by estimating a Dynamic Factor Model (Forni et al., 2000; Stock and Watson,
2002) with VAR(1) dynamics and diagonal idiosyncratic variance. Maximum likelihood estimates of
the factors, their variances and model parameters are obtained using the EM algorithm and Kalman
filter for the DFM cast in state space form, and iterating until convergence. The algorithm is initialized
with static principal components and least squares estimates for the state space parameters. Prior to
estimation, all variables are opportunely transformed to achieve stationarity.
18Results on predictability survive for samples starting after 1994 and ending before the onset of the
financial crisis of 2007-2008 (reported in the Online Appendix).
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[ insert Table II about here ]
Tables III and IV repeat the same exercise for the UK. We use Inflation Report (IR)
forecasts to proxy for the central bank information as in Cloyne and Hu¨rtgen (2016).
As before, we set the forecast revisions equal to zero for the months in which no IR is
scheduled. The macroeconomic and financial factors are extracted from a set of monthly
UK variables selected to be a UK counterpart of the set in McCracken and Ng (2015).19
These enter the regressions with a month’s lag. All regressions include a constant and
four lags of the dependent variable. The sample is 2001:2009 to match that of the orthog-
onal surprises constructed in the next section. Results for the UK largely confirm what
discussed for the US, although the evidence in this case is weaker due to the smaller num-
ber of observations available. Nevertheless, the same qualitative conclusions hold, and
more importantly, the same type of confounding factors related to the forecasts updates
are found. As discussed in the next section, and similar to the US case, the removal of
the anticipation effects proxied by the central banks’ forecasts (here IR) resolves the real
activity puzzles otherwise emerging when using the original market surprises (i.e. the
dependent variable in both Tables III and IV).20 Hence, we find evidence in support of
the decomposition in Eq. (11), despite the weaker statistical significance of the regression
coefficients reported in the tables.
[ insert Table III about here ]
[ insert Table IV about here ]
19The complete list of data and the transformations applied prior to the factor extraction are reported
in the Online Appendix.
20Complementary evidence is reported in Figure A.III in Appendix A, where the ss1 and ss1mir series
are plotted. As shown, expanding the set of policy events to include the minutes and the IR does not
seem to alter the overall informational content of the ss1-based monthly surprise series.
16
5 Orthogonal Monetary Surprises and Shock Identi-
fication
Consistent with the intuition detailed in Section 2, the results collected in the previous
section suggest that market surprises should not be used as external instruments for mon-
etary policy shocks unconditionally. The mere fact of narrowing down the measurement
window to a short time span surrounding the time of the announcement does not guaran-
tee that the price updates are indeed only a function of the underlying monetary policy
shocks. Confounding factors arising from the presence of anticipatory effects can in fact
give rise to important distortions in the estimated IRFs, as discussed in Section 2. In Eq.
(11), it is the misalignment between Ω̂cbt and Ω̂
m
t that causes the anticipatory effects to
arise. We use this observation to construct orthogonal surprises for the identification of
monetary policy shocks.
5.1 Orthogonal Monetary Surprises
We construct instruments for monetary policy shocks using the component of market
surprises that is orthogonal to central banks’ forecasts. Empirically, we project monthly
monetary surprises onto a set containing the lagged interest rate and a set of forecasts and
forecast revisions of the key variables that are likely to enter the central bank’s reaction
function. The composition of the conditioning set is motivated by the decomposition in
Eq. (11), and similar to the one in Romer and Romer (2004). The orthogonal monetary
policy surprises (mps⋆t ) are defined as the residuals of the following regression estimated
at monthly frequency:
mpst = µ + αit−1 + 3∑
j=−1γj Ω̂cbt∣q+j´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
level forecasts
+ 2∑
j=−1 δj [ Ω̂cbt∣q+j − Ω̂cbt−1∣q+j ]´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
forecast revisions
+ mps⋆t . (16)
To proxy for the information included in the central bank’s reaction function at the
time of the announcement, we use staff forecasts produced ahead of policy meetings for
output, inflation, and unemployment. Forecasts horizons considered are the previous and
current quarter, and up to three quarters ahead. We include in the conditioning set both
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the level forecasts and forecast revisions between consecutive forecast dates. Depending
on the release schedule of the variables of interest, these forecasts are substituted with
actually released data whenever they become available. As in Romer and Romer (2004),
we only include unemployment nowcasts due to the strong correlation between output
growth and unemployment. We also include the lagged level of the target interest rate to
control for state-dependent systematic market reactions. Lastly, if the futures contract
is on an interest rate other than the overnight (e.g. Libor), we augment Eq. (16)
with a correction term that takes into account the discrepancy between the two.21 The
variables that enter the conditioning set are either unrevised or have a trackable revision
history, meaning that the conditioning can be carefully done to ensure that the different
information sets are properly aligned at all times.
In Section 2 we postulated that the misalignment between the two sets of forecasts
was responsible for the dependence of market surprises on past information, hypothesis
which we tested in Section 4. By the same token, Eq. (11) implies that once the forecast
asymmetry is accounted for, past data should become uninformative. Consistent with
this intuition, we find that the same set of macro-financial factors used in Section 4 are
uncorrelated with the orthogonal surprises (see Table V), suggesting that the procedure
in Eq. (16) is effective in delivering instruments for the monetary policy shocks that are
orthogonal to the available information, and that also result from policy decisions that are
not taken in response to either current or future economic developments. In this sense,
the orthogonal surprises suggested here are better candidates for the task of capturing
only the unexpected and unanticipated component of monetary policy decisions. The
absence of correlation with past information that results from the orthogonalization in
Eq. (16) also makes the use of orthogonal surprises less dependent on the composition of
the information set in the preferred reduced-form monetary VAR. As discussed in Section
3, the dependence of the instruments on past information (i.e. E [ztX′t−1] ≠ 0) can severely
hinder the correct estimation of the contemporaneous transmission coefficients if the VAR
innovations are also correlated with Xt−1.
21In earlier drafts, the regression in Eq. (16) also included the change in the policy rate that market
participants were reacting to. We removed that regressor due to potential endogeneity concerns. We
note, however, that none of the results are sensitive to the inclusion of this variable. Older orthogonal
surprises are available for download at: http://www.silviamirandaagrippino.com/research/.
18
[ insert Table V about here ]
For the US, the conditioning set contains (a) Greenbook forecasts and forecast revi-
sions for output and inflation for the previous and the current quarter and up to three
quarters ahead, and of current unemployment; and (b) the lagged federal funds rate. We
apply the decomposition in Eq. (16) to surprises extracted from the fourth federal funds
futures. These contracts pay the average federal funds rate that is realized in the expiry
month, and have a three-month maturity. Monthly surprises are constructed by assigning
the daily surprise to the month in which the relevant FOMC announcement is scheduled.
If more than one monthly meeting is present, the surprises are summed within the month.
The original (ff4) and orthogonal (ff4⋆) monthly surprises extracted from the fourth
federal funds futures are plotted in Figure II for the period 1990-2009. The upper time
bound to the construction of the orthogonal surprises is partially constrained by the 5-
year publication lag of the Greenbook forecasts, and more generally motivated by the fed
funds rate reaching the zero lower bound in 2009. The lower bound is constrained by the
availability of daily surprises.
[ insert Figure II about here ]
[ insert Figure III about here ]
Measuring responses to a monetary policy shock in the UK using high-frequency
futures data presents some difficulties, primarily related to the fact that no financial
contract with a sufficiently long history is directly linked to Bank Rate.22 A further
complication in the present context arises from the fact that, over the sample considered,
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meets twelve times a year,
while official forecasts are updated once a quarter. We use surprises from the first short
sterling futures contracts. These pay the 3-month sterling Libor that is realized on the
day of expiry. The conditioning set over which the orthogonal monetary surprises are
calculated is in this case composed by (a) forecasts and forecast revisions for output and
22See Appendix A.
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inflation for the previous and the current quarter and up to three quarters ahead, and for
current unemployment, extracted from the quarterly Inflation Report, and (b) the lagged
Bank Rate and the lagged level of the Libor-OIS spread. The use of Inflation Report
forecasts as a proxy for the Bank of England’s information set is also used in Cloyne
and Hu¨rtgen (2016) to construct a narrative account of UK monetary policy decisions
not taken in response to current and forecast macroeconomic conditions in the spirit
of Romer and Romer (2004). The inclusion of the Libor-OIS spread is intended to
partially offset the fact that the contracts used to extract the surprises are not a direct
function of the interest rate set by the MPC. Being linked to the sterling Libor, the raw
surprises in short sterling futures are rather a measure of the expected change in the 3-
month interbank rate and, to the extent that the relation between the two rates is neither
zero, nor constant, it needs to be controlled for when extracting revisions in expectations
about the policy rate.23 The raw UK monetary surprise used is the one computed around
rate announcements only. The orthogonal surprise ss1⋆ is plotted in Figure III against
its raw counterpart ss1 for the period 2001-2015. While IR forecasts are released at
quarterly frequency and with no significant lag, and thus their timely availability is not a
concern, we end the benchmark sample for the identification in 2009 to avoid introducing
potential distortions caused by Bank Rate reaching its effective lower bound (ELB). The
orthogonal surprise calculated over the benchmark sample only is plotted in Appendix B
(Figure B.III). The start date for the construction of the orthogonal surprise is instead
constrained by the availability of the Libor-OIS spread. It is worth noticing that the
largest peak in the raw surprise disappears in the orthogonal series, in support to the claim
that not all price movements contemporaneous to policy announcements are necessarily
a reaction to monetary policy shocks only. In fact, the peak coincides with the sharp
forecast revisions to growth and unemployment at the onset of the 2009 recession and
the sudden increase in the Libor-OIS spread that occurred in late 2008, and that was
signalling increased fears of insolvency and concerns related to credit availability which
had arguably little to do with the monetary policy decision.
23See Figure A.II. Ideally, one would want the correction for the Libor-OIS spread to happen at the
time of computing the surprises at intraday frequency; however, due to unavailability of intraday swap
quotes for the selected period, the daily spread is used instead.
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5.2 Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks
In the remainder of this section we illustrate the implications of the orthogonalization
proposed above for the identification of monetary policy shocks. To this end, we inten-
tionally rely on small monetary VARs for both the US and the UK to let the differences
between the different instruments stand out. For each of the two countries we rely on
the same VAR and only alter the way in which the monetary policy shocks are identified.
Specifically, we keep fixed the VAR specification, the sample, and the set of endogenous
variables and use alternatively the original and orthogonal monetary surprises as external
instruments for the identification. As a result, the IRFs will display the same type of
dynamics, which are governed by the estimated autoregressive coefficients. Conversely,
any differences between the estimated dynamic responses can be directly attributed to
differences in the external instruments used for the identification.
US We test the implications for monetary shock identification using the ff4 and
ff4⋆ series as external instruments in a Proxy SVAR where the monetary policy variable
is the end-of-month 1-year government bond rate. The use of the fourth federal funds
future in conjunction with the one year rate is borrowed from Gertler and Karadi (2015),
and is intended to capture both conventional and unconventional monetary policy likely
to affect interest rates at medium maturities during the zero lower bound period. Other
endogenous variables are the log of industrial production, the unemployment rate, the
log of CPI and a commodity price index. All variables are taken from the St. Louis
FRED Database, with the exception of the commodity price index, distributed by the
Commodity Research Bureau. The composition of the set is the same as in Coibion (2012)
and Ramey (2016). For the sake of completeness and comparability with results in these
papers, impulse response functions (IRFs) to a monetary policy shock identified using a
recursive Cholesky scheme with the effective federal funds rate replacing the 1-year rate
and ordered last are also reported. The VAR is estimated in levels with 12 lags over the
period 1969:1 - 2014:12. The identification sample is 1990:1 - 2009:12 and corresponds
to the full length of the orthogonal ff4⋆. Responses are normalized such that the policy
rate increases on impact by 1%. Results are in Figure IV. Dashed yellow lines are for
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the recursive identification scheme with the federal funds rate ordered last – chol. Dark
blue (dash-dotted) lines are obtained when the shock is identified using the ff4-based
surprise (psvar) of Gertler and Karadi (2015) – psvar. Red lines are responses obtained
when the orthogonal ff4⋆ surprise series is used instead – psvar⋆. Shaded areas are
68% and 90% bootstrapped confidence bands obtained with 10,000 replications; the wild
bootstrap of Gonc¸alves and Kilian (2004) is used.
[ insert Figure IV about here ]
Differences between the three identifications are stark. IRFs from both chol and
psvar lie outside the confidence bands of psvar⋆ in almost all cases, and particularly
so for the nearer horizons. The issues highlighted for the raw ff4 measures (see also
Appendix A), coupled with a small, presumably informationally deficient VAR, deliver
distorted and counterintuitive responses for both industrial output and unemployment.
Gertler and Karadi (2015) use the weighted ff4 measure to identify effects of the mone-
tary policy shock in a similarly small VAR where, however, they also include the excess
bond premium (EBP) of Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012). Other than being a good pre-
dictor of real activity, the EBP is constructed using micro-level data on corporate spreads
with average maturity of about 7 years. The long maturity of spreads involved in the cal-
culation of the EBP is likely to be at least partially capturing also forecasts about future
realizations that ‘clean’ the VAR residuals and thus still deliver responses of the expected
sign.2425 On the other hand, psvar⋆ responses are less reliant on the composition of the
information set in the VAR, and carry a more conventional sign. Once the anticipation
effects are accounted for, the IRFs depict a recessionary scenario as a consequence of the
24As noted, successful identification of the shocks in a Proxy SVAR depends both on the quality of
the proxy and on the correct specification of the VAR. The importance of the inclusion of the Excess
Bond Premium for the identification of the monetary policy shock in otherwise informationally deficient
VARs is also discussed in Caldara and Herbst (2015).
25The positive responses of output and unemployment are in this case amplified by the use of the
average monthly markets surprise (i.e. the one in Gertler and Karadi, 2015). When the monthly sum
of daily surprises is used instead, that is, no weighting is performed on the daily monetary surprises as
is the case for example in Stock and Watson (2012), the expansionary effects induced by the nowcast
updates and the contractionary effects induced by the monetary policy shock balance out, resulting in
muted responses at all horizons for both output and unemployment in the same VAR used here. IRFs
for this case are not reported but available upon request. Further details on the weighting scheme are
in Appendix A.
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monetary contraction. Although necessarily less precise, psvar⋆ responses are robust to
sample splits and reported in Appendix B (Figure B.I).
UK We build a similar setup to study the effects of the orthogonalization in Eq.
(16) in the UK. The monetary policy shock is identified using alternatively the raw ss1
and the orthogonal ss1⋆ as external instruments, and the monetary policy variable is again
the end-of-month 1-year government bond rate. Other endogenous variables are the log of
industrial production, the LFS (Labour Force Survey) unemployment rate and the log of
the retail price index (RPI).26 Data for Bank Rate and the 1-year government bond rate
are from the Bank of England; prices, output and unemployment data are from the Office
of National Statistics. The VAR is estimated in levels with 12 lags over the period 1979:1
to 2014:12; responses are again normalized such that the policy rate increases by 1%
on impact. The sample used for the identification of the contemporaneous transmission
coefficients excludes the ELB period and goes from 2001:1 to 2009:12. Responses obtained
using the orthogonal ss1⋆ extended to include the ELB period are essentially unaltered,
but estimated with a substantial degree of uncertainty, and reported in Figure B.IV.27
[ insert Figure V about here ]
Responses to a monetary policy shock in the UK are in Figure V. As before, dashed
yellow lines are for the recursive identification scheme where Bank Rate is ordered last
(chol). Dark blue dash-dotted lines are obtained when the shock is identified using the
raw ss1-based surprise (psvar). Red lines are responses obtained when the orthogonal
ss1⋆ surprise series is used – psvar⋆. Responses in Figure V confirm the extent to which
the estimates of the contemporaneous transmission coefficients can be distorted when
raw surprises are used to proxy for the monetary policy shock. Again, chol and psvar
responses lie outside the psvar⋆ confidence bands throughout most of the horizons, and
particularly so on impact. Moreover, as was the case for the US, the spurious information
26Before 1997 the Bank of England’s used the RPI to calibrate its inflation target.
27A further backward extension to June 1997 (not reported) is obtained by assuming that the Libor-
OIS spread is constant and equal to its pre-crisis average over the period 1997:6 - 2000:12. IRFs in this
case are qualitatively the same, but again estimated with significantly greater uncertainty.
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included in the raw ss1 produces responses for output, unemployment and prices that
are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile with economic theory. It is important to notice
here that all MPC meeting are scheduled, and that therefore the presence of anticipatory
effects affects monetary surprises irrespective of the nature of the policy meeting they
refer to. The responses in Figure B.II, obtained when the RPI is replaced with the
consumer price index and the VAR is estimated from 1990:1 to 2014:12, show that again
the identification is robust to sample splits, and the composition of the VAR information
set.
6 Concluding Remarks
Identification of the effects of monetary policy requires isolating exogenous shifts in the
policy variable that are not the expression of the systematic response of the central bank
to actual or foreseen changes in the economic environment. The use of monetary sur-
prises as an identification device implicitly assumes that market participants can correctly
account for the systematic component of policy when they are surprised by an interest
rate decision. And that therefore monetary policy shocks are the only reason why prices
adjust following the announcement.
We show that this is not necessarily the case, and that in fact monetary surprises are
also a function of the disagreement between central banks’ and private sector forecasts.
Whenever there is scope for the two sets of forecasts to differ, the monetary surprises
cannot be thought of as being exogenous, or assumed to be isolating the correct signal.
Monetary surprises are predictable by central banks’ forecasts and by public data
released before the announcements. This lends support to our theory, and has important
consequences for the estimation of the dynamic responses to the shock. Contrary to what
would happen with a valid external instrument, the predictability of monetary surprises
makes the choice of the modelling framework, and of the type and number of variables
included in the system, crucial for the correct identification of the shocks. In the extreme
case in which no controls for future expectations are included, and the VAR is specified
only on a handful of variables, raw surprises can recover responses to monetary policy
shocks that have signs opposite to what macroeconomic theory predicts.
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We develop a new set of proxies for monetary policy shocks that are free of anticipatory
effects and unpredictable by past information. We achieve this by projecting the raw
surprises on a conditioning set that includes central banks’ forecasts and forecast revisions
of the main variables that are likely to enter the policy rule. We use the residuals to
identify monetary policy shocks. These orthogonal surprises retrieve responses of the
main output and price variables that have the desired sign in the same informationally
deficient VARs.
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Figure I: monetary policy shocks and forecast updates in monetary
surprises
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Notes: Responses of variables to the components in market-based monetary surprises. IRFs normalized
to induce 100bp increase in the policy rate. VAR(12) estimated in levels over 1969:1 - 2014:12. The
monetary policy variable is the 1-year rate. Shaded areas are 68 and 90% confidence bands obtained
using 10,000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure II: orthogonal monetary surprises in fourth federal funds
futures
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Notes: Raw (ff4 – blue line) and orthogonal (ff4⋆ – red line) monetary surprises for the US at monthly
frequency. Both sets of surprises are extracted from the fourth federal funds futures contract. Shaded
areas denote NBER recessions.
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Figure III: orthogonal monetary surprises in first short sterling
futures: extended identification sample
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Notes: Raw (ss1 – blue line) and orthogonal (ss1⋆ – red line) monetary surprises for the UK at monthly
frequency. Both sets of surprises are extracted from the first short sterling futures contract. Shaded
areas denote Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) recessions. The vertical dotted line denotes
start of the Effective Lower Bound (ELB) zone.
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Figure IV: responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the
US: raw and orthogonal monetary surprises
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Notes: VAR(12) over the sample 1969:1 - 2014:12. Identification with orthogonal monetary surprises
(ff4⋆, red solid lines), raw monetary surprises (ff4, blue dash-dotted lines), and recursive ordering
(policy rate ordered last, yellow dashed lines). Shaded areas are 68% and 90% bootstrapped confidence
bands. IRFs normalized to a 1% impact increase in the policy rate.
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Figure V: responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the
UK: raw and orthogonal monetary surprises in small VAR
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Notes: VAR(12) over the sample 1979:1 - 2014:12. Identification with orthogonal monetary surprises
(ss1⋆, red solid lines), raw monetary surprises (ss1, blue dash-dotted lines), and recursive ordering
(policy rate ordered last, yellow dashed lines). Shaded areas are 68% and 90% bootstrapped confidence
bands. IRFs normalized to a 1% impact increase in the policy rate.
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Table I: Predictability of Monetary Surprises: Central Bank Forecasts
MP1t FF4t ED2t ED3t ED4t
∆ygb
t∣t 0.013 [1.48] 0.012 [2.02]** 0.012 [1.75]* 0.013 [1.86]* 0.013 [1.96]*
∆ygb
t+1∣t 0.040 [2.90]*** 0.028 [2.31]** 0.034 [2.75]*** 0.030 [2.33]** 0.021 [1.81]*
∆ygb
t+2∣t -0.035 [-1.81]* -0.023 [-1.84]* -0.017 [-1.35] -0.004 [-0.40] 0.007 [0.68]
∆pigb
t∣t -0.004 [-0.30] 0.004 [0.37] 0.009 [0.58] 0.01 [0.64] 0.010 [0.67]
∆pigb
t+1∣t -0.010 [-0.47] -0.003 [-0.17] -0.017 [-0.96] -0.017 [-0.94] -0.011 [-0.62]
∆pigb
t+2∣t 0.044 [1.39] 0.036 [1.67]* 0.045 [2.09]** 0.047 [2.10]** 0.042 [1.85]*
∆ugb
t∣t 0.109 [1.49] 0.094 [2.23]** 0.155 [2.37]** 0.141 [2.13]** 0.147 [2.10]**
∆ugb
t+1∣t -0.311 [-2.02]** -0.305 [-2.83]*** -0.316 [-2.80]*** -0.270 [-2.52]** -0.250 [-2.38]**
∆ugb
t+2∣t 0.156 [1.30] 0.156 [1.76]* 0.119 [1.54] 0.084 [1.13] 0.068 [0.96]
Note: Regressions include a constant and 4 lags of the dependent variable. 1990:2009. From left to right,
the monthly surprise in the first and fourth federal funds futures (MP1t and FF4t), and in the second
(ED2t), third (ED3t), and fourth (ED4t) Eurodollar futures. September 2001 not included. ∆y
gb,
∆pigb and ∆ugb denote Greenbook forecast revisions between consecutive meetings for output, inflation
and unemployment. t-statistics are reported in square brackets, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01,
robust standard errors.
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Table II: Predictability of Monetary Surprises: Past Information
MP1t FF4t ED2t ED3t ED4t
f1,t−1 -0.014 [-1.51] -0.011 [-1.67]* -0.021 [-3.05]*** -0.023 [-3.25]*** -0.021 [-3.21]***
f2,t−1 0.003 [0.63] 0.002 [0.74] 0.004 [1.07] 0.004 [1.18] 0.004 [1.07]
f3,t−1 -0.01 [-1.50] 0.002 [0.37] 0.003 [0.63] 0.003 [0.58] 0.004 [0.72]
f4,t−1 0.015 [1.43] 0.015 [2.05]** 0.015 [2.07]** 0.015 [2.02]** 0.013 [1.91]*
f5,t−1 0.003 [0.34] 0.001 [0.21] -0.001 [-0.14] 0.001 [0.15] 0.004 [0.57]
f6,t−1 -0.013 [-2.02]** -0.012 [-2.19]** -0.011 [-1.89]* -0.012 [-1.90]* -0.013 [-2.18]**
f7,t−1 -0.014 [-1.32] -0.007 [-0.98] -0.009 [-1.21] -0.01 [-1.33] -0.009 [-1.35]
f8,t−1 -0.004 [-0.70] -0.002 [-0.49] -0.001 [-0.16] -0.001 [-0.27] 0.000 [0.07]
f9,t−1 0.002 [0.26] -0.003 [-0.68] -0.008 [-1.63] -0.006 [-1.32] -0.006 [-1.26]
f10,t−1 0.000 [0.01] 0.005 [0.84] 0.003 [0.71] 0.003 [0.64] 0.004 [0.74]
f∗1,t−1 0.022 [2.36]** 0.015 [2.30]** 0.020 [2.78]*** 0.022 [3.17]*** 0.021 [3.12]***
f∗2,t−1 -0.011 [-1.73]* -0.004 [-0.75] -0.005 [-0.88] -0.005 [-0.84] -0.005 [-0.92]
f∗3,t−1 0.006 [1.51] 0.006 [1.47] 0.011 [2.34]** 0.013 [2.62]*** 0.014 [3.14]***
f∗4,t−1 0.014 [1.73]* 0.006 [0.95] 0.004 [0.70] 0.004 [0.65] 0.003 [0.49]
f∗5,t−1 -0.006 [-0.79] -0.002 [-0.37] -0.003 [-0.57] -0.003 [-0.57] -0.003 [-0.62]
Note: top panel: factors extracted from the set of monthly variables in McCracken and Ng (2015).
bottom panel: factors extracted from the set of monthly variables in McCracken and Ng (2015) that are
not subject to revision. Regressions include a constant and 4 lags of the dependent variable. 1990:2009.
From left to right, the monthly surprise in the first and fourth federal funds futures (MP1t and FF4t),
and in the second (ED2t), third (ED3t), and fourth (ED4t) Eurodollar futures. September 2001 not
included. t-statistics are reported in square brackets, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, robust standard
errors.
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Table III: Predictability of UK Monetary Surprises: Central Bank
Forecasts
SS1t SS1Mt SS1MIRt
∆yir
t∣t -0.023 [-0.31] -0.042 [-0.51] -0.051 [-0.64]
∆yir
t+1∣t 0.042 [0.54] 0.042 [0.52] 0.085 [1.10]
∆yir
t+2∣t 0.046 [0.76] 0.06 [0.94] 0.058 [0.80]
∆piir
t∣t -0.05 [-0.73] -0.053 [-0.87] -0.126 [-1.76]*
∆piir
t+1∣t 0.013 [0.11] -0.013 [-0.11] 0.107 [0.76]
∆piir
t+2∣t 0.052 [0.46] 0.072 [0.62] 0.027 [0.19]
∆uir
t∣t -0.245 [-1.28] -0.281 [-1.34] -0.243 [-1.00]
∆uir
t+1∣t 0.576 [1.72]* 0.705 [1.91]* 0.764 [1.76]*
∆uir
t+2∣t -0.431 [-2.03]** -0.51 [-2.21]** -0.601 [-2.17]**
Note: Regressions include a constant and 4 lags of the dependent variable. 2001:2009. From left to
right, the monthly surprise in the first short sterling futures at rate announcement dates (SS1t), rate
announcement and minutes release (SS1Mt), rate, minutes and release of the IR (SS1MIRt). ∆y
ir, ∆piir
and ∆uir denote Inflation Report forecast revisions for output, inflation and unemployment. t-statistics
are reported in square brackets, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, robust standard errors.
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Table IV: Predictability of UK Monetary Surprises: Past Information
SS1t SS1Mt SS1MIRt
f1,t−1 -0.007 [-0.67] -0.008 [-0.72] -0.019 [-1.42]
f2,t−1 0.006 [1.09] 0.005 [0.89] 0.002 [0.34]
f3,t−1 0.005 [0.86] 0.005 [0.83] 0.007 [1.06]
f4,t−1 -0.011 [-1.27] -0.011 [-1.29] -0.016 [-1.70]*
f5,t−1 -0.015 [-1.79]* -0.015 [-1.76]* -0.02 [-2.04]**
f6,t−1 -0.012 [-1.54] -0.011 [-1.44] -0.013 [-1.43]
f7,t−1 0.011 [1.56] 0.013 [1.71]* 0.017 [1.89]*
f8,t−1 0.003 [0.73] 0.005 [1.00] 0.007 [1.28]
f9,t−1 0.012 [1.18] 0.013 [1.25] 0.019 [1.53]
f10,t−1 0.001 [0.21] 0.003 [0.44] 0.005 [0.82]
f∗1,t−1 0.000 [-0.05] 0.000 [-0.03] 0.007 [0.62]
f∗2,t−1 0.013 [1.29] 0.012 [1.21] 0.017 [1.45]
f∗3,t−1 0.001 [0.14] 0.000 [0.00] -0.003 [-0.49]
f∗4,t−1 -0.007 [-1.07] -0.005 [-0.76] -0.003 [-0.35]
f∗5,t−1 -0.011 [-1.19] -0.012 [-1.28] -0.015 [-1.40]
Note: top panel: macro-financial factors extracted from last vintage data. bottom panel: macro-
financial factors extracted from unrevised data. Regressions include a constant and 4 lags of the depen-
dent variable. 2001:2009. From left to right, the monthly surprise in the first short sterling futures at
rate announcement dates (SS1t), rate announcement and minutes release (SS1Mt), rate, minutes and
release of the IR (SS1MIRt). t-statistics are reported in square brackets, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01, robust standard errors.
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Table V: Orthogonal Surprises and Past Information
MP1⋆t FF4⋆t ED2⋆t ED3⋆t ED4⋆t
f1,t−1 0.005 [0.65] 0.003 [0.44] 0.004 [0.65] 0.002 [0.36] 0.001 [0.22]
f2,t−1 0.003 [0.56] 0.002 [0.66] 0.004 [1.29] 0.005 [1.25] 0.004 [1.18]
f3,t−1 0.004 [0.74] 0.008 [1.64] 0.009 [1.88]* 0.009 [1.70]* 0.007 [1.45]
f4,t−1 0.010 [1.09] 0.011 [1.66]* 0.008 [1.21] 0.008 [1.24] 0.007 [1.05]
f5,t−1 0.001 [0.12] -0.002 [-0.31] 0.000 [-0.04] 0.001 [0.19] 0.003 [0.38]
f6,t−1 -0.008 [-1.39] -0.007 [-1.35] -0.005 [-0.86] -0.005 [-0.89] -0.006 [-1.12]
f7,t−1 -0.009 [-0.94] -0.007 [-1.09] -0.007 [-1.06] -0.009 [-1.37] -0.01 [-1.45]
f8,t−1 -0.005 [-0.91] -0.001 [-0.37] 0.002 [0.45] 0.002 [0.49] 0.004 [0.91]
f9,t−1 0.000 [-0.02] -0.004 [-0.93] -0.007 [-1.51] -0.005 [-1.12] -0.004 [-0.89]
f10,t−1 -0.006 [-1.02] -0.001 [-0.12] 0.000 [-0.07] -0.001 [-0.16] 0.001 [0.16]
f∗1,t−1 -0.001 [-0.14] -0.001 [-0.12] -0.004 [-0.68] -0.002 [-0.36] -0.001 [-0.11]
f∗2,t−1 0.000 [-0.06] 0.001 [0.15] -0.001 [-0.13] -0.001 [-0.18] -0.002 [-0.31]
f∗3,t−1 0.001 [0.39] 0.002 [0.76] 0.005 [1.40] 0.006 [1.58] 0.007 [1.92]*
f∗4,t−1 0.009 [1.23] 0.004 [0.83] 0.002 [0.30] 0.002 [0.44] 0.003 [0.50]
f∗5,t−1 0.001 [0.24] 0.005 [1.11] 0.005 [1.01] 0.006 [1.28] 0.006 [1.18]
F − stat 0.74 (0.592) 0.92 (0.470) 0.92 (0.471) 1.29 (0.267) 1.47 (0.201)
Note: top panel: factors extracted from the set of monthly variables in McCracken and Ng (2015).
bottom panel: factors extracted from the set of monthly variables in McCracken and Ng (2015) that are
not subject to revision. Regressions include a constant and 4 lags of the dependent variable. 1990:2009.
From left to right, the component of monetary surprises orthogonal to central bank’s forecasts in the
first and fourth federal funds futures (MP1⋆t and FF4⋆t ), and in the second (ED2⋆t ), third (ED3⋆t ),
and fourth (ED4⋆t ) Eurodollar futures. September 2001 not included. t-statistics are reported in square
brackets, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, robust standard errors. In the last row, ne null hypothesis
is that all the coefficients of the unrevised factors are jointly zero, p-values in parentheses.
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A Monetary Surprises from Futures on Interest Rates
A.1 US Raw Monetary Surprises
Sack (2004) discusses the technical procedure for the extraction of policy expectations
from both Federal Funds (FF) and Eurodollar (ED) futures. These are shown to be
accurate predictors of the policy rate in Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2006). Let ff (h)
and ed(h) denote respectively the price of the FF and ED expiring on day h of a given
month with N days then:
ff (h) = 100 − 1
N
N∑
j=1 ij, (A.1)
ed(h) = 100 − $lib(h+90)h , (A.2)
where it is the effective fed funds rate and $lib
(h+90)
h is the 3-month US dollar Libor
fixing on day h. When expressed in rates, the equations above transform as follows:
p
(h)
t,FF = Et ( 1N N∑j=1 ij) + ζ(h)FF,t, (A.3)
p
(h)
t,ED = Et [$lib(h+90)h ] + ζ(h)ED,t
= Et [ i¯h+90h ] +Et [$lib(h+90)h − i¯h+90h ] + ζ(h)ED,t. (A.4)
i¯h+90h denotes the average rates over the 90 days (3 months) starting from day h, i.e.
i¯h+90h ≡ 190 ∑90j=1 ih+j. While the link between FF and it is direct, when dealing with EDs
an additional step in which expectations about future Libor fixings are translated into
expectations about the policy rate is required. The terms ζ
(h)
.,t denote (possibly time-
varying) term/risk premia in both equations. In Eq. (A.4), the ED rate is expressed as a
function of three terms: (a) the expectation of the short-term rate over the three-month
period starting from the expiration of the contract – h; (b) a term reflecting ‘basis risk’,
that is, the compensation that investors require for lending to an institution over a 3-
month period rather than on an overnight basis; and (c) a residual risk premium which
encompasses everything that is not explicitly associated to either (a) or (b).
Kuttner (2001) constructs monetary surprises in the US using daily data on federal
funds futures expiring in the current month. Gu¨rkaynak (2005) and Gu¨rkaynak et al.
(2005) use futures covering maturities which go out about 3.5 quarters and intraday
quotes. Federal funds futures settle based on the average effective federal funds rate
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(EFFR) calculated over the relevant expiry month, therefore, if ff
(0)
t−∆t denotes the current
month futures just before (−∆t) the FOMC meeting, and it is the EFFR:
ff
(0)
t−∆t = nN Et−∆t[ iτ≤t ] + N − nN Et−∆t[ iτ≥t ] + ζ(0)FF,t−∆t. (A.5)
In the equation above, N is the number of days in the month and n is the day of the
FOMC meeting, t the time of the announcement, and ζ
(0)
FF,t−∆t a risk or term premium
that may be present in the contract. The scaling is such that it avoids overweighting
when the FOMC meets at the end of the month by using the next month’s contract if
certain timing criteria are met (see Gu¨rkaynak, 2005). The monetary policy surprise –
mps
(0)
t – can be computed as:
mps
(0)
t = NN − n [ ff (0)t − ff (0)t−∆t ]
= (Et[ iτ≥t ] −Et−∆t[ iτ≥t] ) + ( ζ(0)FF,t − ζ(0)FF,t−∆t ) . (A.6)
Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) assume that the latter term in the equation above is zero, de
facto implying that it takes longer than the ∆t time frame for the announcement to
modify the premium. The surprises that relate to announcements further ahead in the
future are derived in an equivalent way using futures that refer to the month in which
the relevant FOMC announcement is scheduled to happen.
The raw monetary surprise extracted from the fourth fed funds futures (FF4) and ag-
gregated at monthly frequency is plotted in Figure A.I. The top panel of the chart reports
the monthly average surprise in Gertler and Karadi (2015) (blue line) and the raw series
that assigns each daily surprise in Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) to the month
in which the corresponding meeting was scheduled to happen (red line).28 The bottom
row of the chart reports (from left to right) the scatter plot of the two monthly mea-
sures and the partial autocorrelation function of the weighted and unweighted monthly
surprises respectively. The weighted series exhibits some degree of autocorrelation, also
noted in Ramey (2016). The weighting procedure of Gertler and Karadi (2015) can be
summarised in two steps: (1) for each day of the month, the surprise is equal to the sum
of surprises in FOMC days within the past month; (2) for each month, the surprise is
equal to the average of the daily series in the previous step. The procedure induces a
significant time-dependence in the monthly series. To see this, note that the autocor-
relation is only marginally significant when monthly surprises are just the sum of daily
movements (unweighted series). A more serious concern, however, is in the alignment
28The procedure follows Romer and Romer (2004); if there is more than one FOMC meeting in the
same month, the monthly surprise is equal to the sum of the surprises registered in that month.
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Figure A.I: monthly aggregation of US-based monetary surprises
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Notes: Raw FF4-based monetary surprises at monthly frequency. The weighted series is from Gertler
and Karadi (2015). The unweighted surprise is constructed as the sum of daily surprises in Gu¨rkaynak
et al. (2005). In the bottom panel, from left to right, the different information content in the two series
and their partial autocorrelation functions.
of the two series, visible in the top panel of the chart. The weighting of daily surprises
shifts the monthly surprise series forward; this implies that also the alignment with the
information set (and thus the residuals) of the VAR is distorted. As a result, we use the
unweighted monthly surprises as the basis for our analysis.
A.2 UK Raw Monetary Surprises
The case for the UK differs form the US in some non-trivial ways. The Bank of England
implements the Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) decisions by adjusting the level
of Bank Rate, to which no financial market instrument is directly linked. The closest
alternative is Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) contracts. In these contracts, the parties
agree to exchange fixed interest rate payments against payments based on the Sterling
Overnight Index Average (SONIA). Because the level of credit risk in overnight trans-
actions is typically very low, SONIA rates track Bank Rate closely. Furthermore, and
for the same reason, the implied path of SONIA rates at short horizons should also be
relatively free of material risk premia. The contracts, however, are only available for a
limited time span and, until the years immediately preceding the global financial crisis,
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seldom traded at maturities beyond 6 months. The next best alternative is to use short
sterling (SS) futures contracts, whose forecasting performance is only slightly inferior to
OIS rates.29 These contracts settle based on the 3-month interbank (GBP) Libor rate
rather than on overnight rates, but are exchange-traded and available for a much longer
history.
Because Eurodollar (ED) futures also settle on the (US dollar) Libor rather than
on the effective fed funds rate, they are the natural starting point to work out policy
expectations in the UK. Building on the decomposition in Sack (2004) – Eq. (A.4) –, let
ss(h) denote the price of a short sterling futures expiring on day h. We have that
ss(h) = 100 − £lib(h+90)h , (A.7)
where £lib(h+90)h is the 3-month sterling Libor fixing on day h. Following the same logic
in Eq.(A.4), the rate at time t can then be expressed as
p
(h)
t,ss = Et [£lib(h+90)h ] + ζ(h)SS,t,
= Et [¯ih+90h ] +Et [£lib(h+90)h − i¯h+90h ] + ζ(h)SS,t, (A.8)
where it is assumed that the overnight rate it is equivalent to the policy rate up to a
negligible additive error. i¯h+90h denotes the average overnight rate over the 90 days (3
months) starting from day h, i.e. i¯h+90h ≡ 190 ∑90j=1 ih+j.
The rates involved in Eq. (A.8) and a detail on the time variation of the Libor-OIS
spread are in Figure A.II for the sample 01/01/2000 - 31/05/2015. The overnight rate
is the one that most closely tracks the policy rate over the whole sample considered.
The 3-month Libor on the other hand typically lies above the policy/overnight rates
reflecting the risk involved in lending at further away maturities. While it is now widely
regarded as one of the key measures of credit risk premia, the Libor-OIS spread – i.e.
the second term in Eq. (A.8), drew relatively little attention in the years preceding the
onset of the financial crisis: its level remained very low (around 11bps) and substantially
flat for years, reflecting the belief that the level of credit risk involved in the financial
system was not only very small, but also constant. Starting from 2008, however, doubts
29The quality of market-based policy path forecasts, including those derived from SS contracts, is
discussed in Joyce, Relleen and Sorensen (2008). The exercise is similar in spirit to Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and
Swanson (2006), but in this case also yield curves are added to the horserace. The two zero-coupon yield
curves used in the analysis are the ones estimated and published by the Bank of England; the Government
Liability Curve (GLC), derived from UK government bonds (‘gilts’) and general collateral repo rates, and
the Bank Liability Curve (BLC), based instead on Libor interest rates, short sterling futures, Forward
Rates Agreements and Libor-based interest rates swaps. Since yield curves are estimated and published
at daily frequency, we discard them from the subsequent analysis.
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Figure A.II: components of short sterling futures
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Notes: [left] Relevant interest rates for short sterling futures rates decomposition. [right] Libor-OIS
spreads obtained as the difference between the 3-month sterling Libor and the 3-month OIS curve, and
from basis swaps (front contract, basis swap spread). All rates are at daily frequency over the sample
01/01/2000 - 31/05/2015. See equation (A.8) for details. Source: Bloomberg, author calculations.
about financial institutions’ solvency and concerns related to market liquidity induced a
rise in Libors which made the spread jump to unprecedented levels. As the Libor-OIS
spread moved away from its long-run average, basis swaps involving expected risk at
different maturities started being traded and thus, from that date, expectations about
future spreads can be read from the swap quotes. In the absence of such contracts, that is
prior to 2008, the actual difference between the 3-month sterling Libor and the 3-month
OIS curve can be used to compute the expected spread. This is equivalent to setting
h = 0 in Et [£lib(h+90)h − i¯h+90h ].
Let p
(h)
t,BS denote the basis swap quotes matching the expectation components in Eq.
(A.8) at any time t, and let the relevant policy announcement happen within the time
interval [t−∆t, t], such that ∆t denotes the width of the time window around which the
response is measured. In the absence of any conflicting event the raw monetary policy
surprise is given by:
mps
(h)
t = (p(h)t,SS − p(h)t−∆t,SS) − (p(h)t,BS − p(h)t−∆t,BS) ,
= (Et [¯ih+90h ] −Et−∆t [¯ih+90h ]) + (ζ(h)t − ζ(h)t−∆t) . (A.9)
Figure A.III plots the monthly surprises in the first short sterling futures from June
1997 to 2015. The starting date is chosen to coincide with the first decision meeting
after the MPC independence. SS delivery dates are such that the first three contracts
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expire towards the end of three consecutive months, the first of which is the current
one.30 To construct the raw monetary surprise, at any date in the sample we use the
next expiring SS futures, or front contract (ss1). Because liquidity in these markets
tends to become very thin when the expiration date approaches, if the MPC date falls in
the vicinity of the expiry date, the next contract is used instead. The top panel of the
chart compares monthly surprises measured around announcement only (blue line) and
all policy-relevant events in the same month, that is, the release of the minutes and of the
Inflation Report (red dotted line). Surprises are computed in narrow 30-minute windows
tightly surrounding the policy event. The historical set of policy rate decisions dates
and times, and the decision that resulted from the committee meetings are reconstructed
using Bloomberg. A different strategy is adopted in case of the release of the Inflation
Report: due to the press conference associated with the release lasting a full hour, more
flexibility is allowed in this case by employing a 90-minute window. Raw intraday data
are from Thomson Reuters Tick History Database. For the construction of the monthly
surprise we again follow Romer and Romer (2004) and assign each surprise to the month
of the corresponding announcement.
In a non-negligible number of instances within the sample considered, some of the
policy-relevant events around which the surprises are computed are contemporaneous to
major macroeconomic data release. While the Bank Rate decision is typically released
to the public at 12:00 noon, when no other data releases are scheduled, the release of the
minutes and of the Inflation Report (IR) are contemporaneous to a number of relevant
data releases that are also likely to substantially influence markets.31 This is particularly
true for the release of the minutes of the MPC meetings, the date and time of which
often coincide with the release of labour market data and statistics on money and lending
activities and, in some instances, GDP figures. To account for these interferences, in all
cases we control for (standardized) data news falling within the time window around
which the surprise is measured. Data news are computed as the difference between the
released value and the median nowcast of the Bloomberg Survey of Economists as in
Scotti (2013) and Altavilla, Giannone and Modugno (2014).
The top panel and the bottom left subplot of Figure A.III reveal that while there are
some differences between the two series, expanding the set of policy events to include
the minutes and the IR does not seem to modify substantially the overall information
content of the monthly surprise series. We take this as evidence of the fact that on
30https://www.theice.com/products/37650330/Three-Month-Sterling-Short-Sterling-Future
31In the summer of 2015 the Bank of England adopted a different release schedule whereby the rate
announcement and the minutes of the meeting are released simultaneously to the public at 12 noon.
When the IR is also due for release, it is added to the block (e.g. “super Thursday” of August 6th,
2015).
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Figure A.III:
informational content of UK-based monetary surprises calculated on
different sets of policy events
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Raw ss1-based monetary surprise at monthly frequency. Surprises are computed around Bank Rate
announcements only ( ss1 - blue line) and when also minutes and releases of the Inflation Report are
taken into account ( ss1mir - red dotted line). All surprises control for data releases contemporaneous
to the policy events in the sample considered. In the bottom panel, from left to right, the different
information content in the two series and their partial autocorrelation functions.
the day of the rate decisions, market participants infer what the MPC’s assessment for
current and future economic outlook is likely to be, and interpret the policy decision
accordingly. Contrary to the US, raw UK-based monthly surprises display some (negative)
autocorrelation even if no weighting scheme is adopted in their construction. The presence
of autocorrelation in the first lag persists also if the effective lower bound period (post
March 2009) is removed from the analysis.
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B Additional Charts
Figure B.I: raw and orthogonal monetary across subsamples - US
Industrial Production
 0  6 12 18 24 30 36 42
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
% 
po
in
ts
Unemployment Rate
 0  6 12 18 24 30 36 42
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
CPI All
 0  6 12 18 24 30 36 42
-1
-0.5
0
CRB Commodity Price Index
 0  6 12 18 24 30 36 42
-2
0
2
4
Policy Rate
 0  6 12 18 24 30 36 42
horizon
0
0.5
1 Cholesky
Raw Market Surprise
Orthogonal Proxy
(a) US - VAR(12). Estimation sample 1969:1 - 2007:12, identification sample 1990:1 - 2007:12.
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(b) US - VAR(12) Estimation sample 1990:1 - 2012:12, identification sample 1990:1 - 2009:12.
Notes: US - Alternative estimation and identification samples. Recursive identification (yellow dashed)
vs identification with external instruments based on the weighted raw ff4 (dark blue dash-dotted) and
orthogonal ff4⋆ monetary surprise (red). 68% and 90% bootstrapped confidence bands are obtained
with 10,000 replications. IRFs normalized to a 1% impact increase in the policy rate.
47
Figure B.II: raw and orthogonal surprises across subsamples - UK
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Notes: UK - VAR(12). Estimation sample 1990:1 - 2014:12, identification sample 2001:1 - 2009:12. Recur-
sive identification (yellow dashed) vs identification with external instruments based on the weighted raw
ss1 (dark blue dash-dotted) and orthogonal ss1⋆ monetary surprise (red). 68% and 90% bootstrapped
confidence bands are obtained with 10,000 replications. IRFs normalized to a 1% impact increase in the
policy rate.
Figure B.III: raw and orthogonal ss1 surprises: benchmark
identification sample
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Notes: UK - Benchmark Sample 2001:2009. Raw (ss1 – blue line) and orthogonal (ss1⋆ – red line)
monetary surprises at monthly frequency. Both sets of surprises are extracted from the first short
sterling future. Shaded areas denote Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) recessions.
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Figure B.IV: raw and orthogonal surprises - extended identification
sample - UK
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(a) UK - VAR(12). Estimation sample 1979:1 - 2014:12, identification sample 2001:1 - 2015:3.
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(b) UK - VAR(12) Estimation sample 1990:1 - 2014:12, identification sample 1997:7 - 2015:3.
Notes: UK - Alternative identification samples. Recursive identification (yellow dashed) vs identification
with external instruments based on the raw ss1 (dark blue dash-dotted) and orthogonal ss1⋆ monetary
surprise (red). 68% and 90% bootstrapped confidence bands are obtained with 10,000 replications.
Shocks are normalized to induce a 1% increase in the policy rate.
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